Motivation
The ability to reason in a 'rational' way with incomplete or inconsistent information is a major challenge, and its significance should be obvious. It is well-known that classical logic is not suitable for this task, thus non-classical formalisms are usually used for handling uncertainty.
1 Such formalisms should be able to distinguish among different types of inconsistent information and partial data with different degrees of uncertainty that may appear in the same theory, since each kind of uncertainty may require a different treatment and may have a different effect on the set of the consequences of the theory. To see this, consider, e.g., the following well-known example: EXAMPLE 1 (TWEETY DILEMMA). -Given a knowledge-base with the following set of assertions (specified in some appropriate formal language): 1) Flying ability is a default property of birds.
2) A wounded bird might not fly. where L = {(x, y) ∈ R 2 | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}, D = {(1, y) | y ∈ R, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}, and the lattice operators are defined as follows:
(x 1 , y 1 ) ∨ (x 2 , y 2 ) = (max(x 1 , x 2 ), min(y 1 , y 2 )), (x 1 , y 1 ) ∧ (x 2 , y 2 ) = (min(x 1 , x 2 ), max(y 1 , y 2 )).
In this case, t = (1, 0), f = (0, 1), ⊤ = (1, 1), ⊥ = (0, 0), and (x 1 , y 1 ) ≤ (x 2 , y 2 ) iff x 1 ≤ x 2 and y 1 ≥ y 2 .
5 One way to intuitively understand the meaning of an element (x, y) ∈ L is such that x represents the amount of belief for the underlying assertion, and y represents the amount of belief against it. Following this intuition, every element (x, x) ∈ L may be associated with a different degree of inconsistency.
Given a logical lattice (L, D), the basic connectives are defined in the standard way: negation corresponds to the lattice involution, conjunction [respectively, disjunction] corresponds to the meet [respectively, join] operator, and the material implication is defined by a combination of negation and disjunction: p → q = ¬p∨q. Standard semantic notions are natural generalizations of the classical ones: a (multiple-valued) valuation ν is a function that assigns an element of L to each atomic formula. The set of valuations onto L is denoted by V L . Extension to complex formulae is done in the usual way: ν(¬ψ) = ¬ν(ψ), and ν(ψ • φ) = ν(ψ) • ν(φ) for every • ∈ {∨, ∧, →}. A valuation is a model of a set of assertions Γ if it assigns a designated value to every formula in Γ. The set of all the models of Γ is denoted by mod(Γ).
Note that there are no tautologies in the language of {¬, ∨, ∧, →}, since if all the atomic formulae that appear in a formula ψ are assigned ⊥ by a valuation ν, then ν(ψ) = ⊥ as well. It follows that the definition of the material implication p → q as ¬p∨q is not adequate for representing entailments in our semantics. Instead, we use another connective, which does function as an implication in our setting: DEFINITION 3 ([AVR 91, ARI 96]). -Let (L, D) be a logical lattice. For every x, y ∈ L, define: x ⊃ y = y if x ∈ D, and x ⊃ y = t otherwise. 6 The language of {¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃} together with the propositional constants t, f, ⊤ and ⊥ (which correspond to the four elements that appear in every logical lattice), will be denoted by Σ. Given a set of formulae Γ in Σ, we shall denote by A(Γ) the set of the atomic formulae that appear in the formulae of Γ. Now, a natural definition of a lattice-based consequence relation is the following: The relation |= L,D of Definition 4 is a consequence relation in the standard sense of Tarski [TAR 41 ]. In [ARI 96 ] it is shown that this relation is monotonic, compact, paraconsistent [COS 74 ], and has a corresponding sound and complete cut-free Gentzen-style proof system. The major drawbacks of |= L,D are that it is strictly weaker than classical logic even for consistent theories (e.g., |= L,D ¬ψ ∨ ψ), and that it always invalidates some intuitively justified inference rules, such as the Disjunctive Syllogism (ψ, ¬ψ ∨ φ |= L,D φ). In the next section we consider a family of logics that preserve the nice properties of |= L,D and overcome most of its drawbacks.
Preferential reasoning and the consequence relation |=

L,D c
In order to recapture within our framework classical reasoning (where its use is appropriate), as well as standard non-monotonic and paraconsistent methods, we incorporate a concept first introduced by McCarthy [MCC 80] and later considered by Shoham [SHO 88 ], according to which inferences from a given theory are made with respect to a subset of the models of that theory (and not according to every model of the theory; see also [GAB 85, MAK 89, KRA 90, MAK 94, ARI 99, ARI 00b, SCH 00, LEH 01]). This set of preferential models is determined according to some conditions that can be specified by a set of (usually second-order) propositions [ARI 02b], or by some order relation on the models of the theory [PRI 89, PRI 91, ARI 96, ARI 98a, ARI 98b, BES 03]. This relation should reflect some kind of preference criterion on the models of the set of premises. In our case the idea is to give precedence to those valuations that minimize the amount of uncertain information in the premises. The truth values are therefore arranged according to an order relation that reflects differences in the amount of uncertainty that each one of them exhibits. Then we choose those valuations that minimize the amount of uncertainty with respect to this order. The intuition behind this approach is that incomplete or contradictory data correspond 6. Note that on {t, f } the material implication (→) and the new implication (⊃) are identical, and both of them are generalizations of the classical implication. 7. When referring to FOUR we shall abbreviate |= L,D by |= 4 .
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to inadequate information about the real world, and therefore should be minimized. Next we formalize this idea.
DEFINITION 5. -A partial order < on a set S is called modular if y < x 2 for every x 1 , x 2 , y ∈ S s.t. x 1 < x 2 , x 2 < x 1 , and y < x 1 .
PROPOSITION 6 ([LEH 92]
). -Let < be a partial order on S. The following conditions are equivalent: a) < is modular.
b) for every x 1 , x 2 , y ∈ S, if x 1 < x 2 then either y < x 2 or x 1 < y. c) there is a totally ordered set S ′ with a strict order ≺ and a function g : Inconsistency orders are used here for grading uncertainty in general, and inconsistency in particular. The intuitive meaning of x < L,D c y is that formulae that are assigned x are more definite than formulae with a truth value y. Modularity is needed for assuring a proper grading of the truth values.
8 Condition (b) in Definition 7 assures that truth values that intuitively represent inconsistent data will not be considered as more consistent than those ones that correspond to consistent data. The last condition makes sure that any truth value and its negation have the same degree of (in)consistency. EXAMPLE 8. -F OUR has four inconsistency orders:
a) The degenerated order, < 4 c0 , in which t, f, ⊥, ⊤ are all incomparable. b) < 4 c1 , in which ⊥ is considered as minimally inconsistent:
In the rest of the paper we shall continue to use the notations of Example 8 for denoting the inconsistency orders in F OUR.
Given an inconsistency order < L,D c on a logical lattice (L, D), it induces an equivalence relation on L, in which two elements in L are equivalent iff they are equal or < L,D c -incomparable. For every x ∈ L, we denote by [x] the equivalence class of x with respect to this equivalence relation. I.e.,
8.
That is, to eliminate orders such as {{t}, {f < ⊥ < ⊤}}, in which ⊤ and ⊥ are not comparable with t, while they are comparable with ¬t.
[x] = {y | y = x, or x and y are <
The order relation on these classes is defined as usual by representatives:
y, or x and y are < L,D c -incomparable. 9 It is easy to verify that this definition is proper, i.e., it does not depend on the choice of the representatives. In what follows we shall write
An inconsistency order on (L, D) induces the following pre-order on V L :
be an inconsistency order on (L, D), and let
be an inconsistency order on a logical lattice (L, D) and let Γ be a set of formulae in Σ. The c-most consistent models of Γ (abbreviation:
The lattice-based consequence relation |= L,D (Definition 4) may be refined now such that only the c-most consistent models of the premises are taken into account for drawing conclusions:
Examples
Below are some examples of reasoning with |=
. In what follows we assume that formulae with free variables are universally quantified. Consequently, a set of assertions Γ, containing a non-grounded formula, ψ, is viewed as representing the corresponding set of ground formulae, formed by substituting for each variable that appears in ψ, every element in the relevant Herbrand universe. EXAMPLE 12. -Consider one direction of the barber paradox:
Denote by ν 1 , ν 2 , and ν 3 the valuations that assign t, ⊥, and ⊤ (respectively) to the assertion shaves(Barber, Barber). Using F OUR as the underlying logical lattice, we have that
ci shaves(Barber, Barber) when i = 0, 1, while Γ |= 4 ci shaves(Barber, Barber) when i = 2, 3.
9. As usual, we use the same notation to denote the order relation among equivalence classes and the order relation among their elements. 
We are using here different implication connectives according to the strength of each entailment: the first two rules state only default properties of birds and wounded animals. The other three rules, on the other hand, specify characteristic properties of penguins and characterize animals with wings. As there are no exceptions to these rules, they are expressed by a stronger implication connective.
Consider, first, the following set of assertions:
As shown in Table 1 , Γ 1 has 240 four-valued models, among which six are c 1 -mcms, and two are both c 2 -mcms and c 3 -mcms. 
It follows that with |= 4 ci (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) one can infer from Γ 1 that bird(Tweety), fly(Tweety), and ¬wounded(Tweety) (the converse assertions, ¬bird(Tweety), ¬fly(Tweety), and wounded(Tweety), are, nevertheless, not deducible). This corresponds to the intuitive expectation that, as long as the only data concerning Tweety is that it is a bird, we follow the default assumption that it can fly, and we don't have 10. Recall that we are using here the notations of Example 8 to denote the inconsistency orders in FOUR. In what follows we shall also write |= any reason to believe that it is wounded. On the other hand, excluding the possibility that Tweety is a penguin seems a more far reaching conclusion than the previous two, and indeed only |= 4 c2 and |= 4 c3 support this conclusion. Finally, as we do not know anything about animals with wings, except the fact that they are birds, none of |= 4 ci , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, allows us to conclude or to rule out the possibility that Tweety has wings.
Suppose now that a new information arrives, and we are informed that Tweety is actually a penguin. Denote the new theory by Γ 2 , i.e.,
Clearly, Γ 2 is no longer classically consistent, which implies that everything classically follows from it. On the other hand, as it is shown in Section 4 below, consequence relations of the form |=
are paraconsistent, and so they do not have this drawback. Indeed, consider the four-valued models of Γ 2 and its c i -mcms, shown in Table 2 . 
This time, bird(Tweety), penguin(Tweety), and ¬fly(Tweety) are all deducible from Γ 2 with respect to |= 4 ci for i = 1, 2, 3, and the complements of these assertions cannot be inferred by any one of these consequence relations, as indeed one expects.
Consider, finally, the following set of assertions:
Again, Γ 3 is not consistent, and indeed even its c i -most consistent models (i = 1, 2, 3) assign ⊤ to at least one of its atomic formulae 11 (see Table 3 for the c i -mcms of Γ 3 ). However, as already noted in Example 1, the contradiction in this case is more 11. I.e., for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and for every ν ∈ !(Γ3, ≤ • 3-4/2003 fundamental than that of Γ 2 , since it is not possible to judge from the information in Γ 3 whether Fred can still fly despite its injury.
12 Indeed, by Table 3 it follows that none of the consequence relations |= 4 ci , i = 1, 2, 3, allows to conclude that fly(Fred) or that ¬fly(Fred). 
-By the last two examples one might get the wrong impression that the set of the c 1 -mcms of a given theory always contains the set of the c 2 -mcms and the set of the c 3 -mcms of the same theory. To see that this is not the case, consider again the last example with two additional (and somewhat more controversial) rules:
The (c i -most consistent) models of Γ ′ 2 are given in Table 4 . It follows, for instance, that while with |= 4 c2 and |= 4 c3 there are indications that Tweety is not a 'typical' penguin (as penguin(Tweety) is assigned ⊤ by some c 2 -mcms and c 3 -mcms of Γ ′ 2 ), the consequence relation |= 4 c1 rules out the possibility that Tweety is not a penguin:
Note also that, unlike the examples above, the set of the c 2 -mcms of a theory is in general different than the set of the c 3 -mcms of the same theory. This is shown in Proposition 25 below.
Embedding in four-valued logics
Four-valued reasoning may be traced back to the 1950's, where is has been investigated by a number of people, including Bialynicki-Birula [BIA 57a], Rasiowa 12. Note, however, the it is possible to conclude that Fred is a bird, although this fact is not explicitly mentioned in Γ3. 
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 15. For this, we first need some notations and definitions.
if for every Γ and every ν ∈ mod(Γ),
), then it is in particular stoppered.
t. the induced order on valuations).
13. This is a generalization of a similar result that is given in the reduced version of this paper [ARI 03a], in which stopperdness (Definition 16) was assumed. 14. 
Henceforth we shall usually omit the superscripts, and just write
a) x 1 and x 2 are similar if
b) ν 1 and ν 2 are similar if for every atom p, ν 1 (p) and ν 2 (p) are similar. 
, and by ω : L → {t, f, ⊤, ⊥} the 'categorization' function: ω(y) = x iff y ∈ T x . Also, in the rest of this proof we shall abbreviate
).
L is called pointwise if there is a pre-order ≤ on L such that for every ν1, ν2 ∈ V L , ν1 ν2 iff for every atom p, ν1(p) ≤ ν2(p). 17. Note that the fact that D is a prime filter is crucial here.
PROOF. -Suppose that there is some atom p 0 s.t.
M (p 0 ). Consider the following valuation:
N is similar to M , and so, by Proposition 21, N is also a model of
is well-founded and since T x is nonempty for every
T x is nonempty as well, and so there is at least one element of the form m x for every x ∈ {t, f, ⊤, ⊥}. Also, it is clear that for every 
. Thus, by Lemma 23,
Also, by the same lemma,
It follows that N 4 < 4 ci M 4 , but this contradicts the assumption that M 4 is a c
For the converse, suppose that Γ |=
, and there is an atom p 0 for which this inequality is strict:
Now, by the definition of N L we have that for every atom p,
, and by
Now, by Lemma 24, Theorem 15 is obtained. s
Reasoning with |= L,D c
In this section we consider some basic properties of |=
. By Theorem 15, it is sufficient to consider F OUR and the four corresponding consequence relations |= . See Figure 2 for the details. 
The c 4 i -mcms of Γ are given in Table 5 . 
It is easy to verify that for every 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, the consequences of Γ w.r.t. |= 
, and q ⊃ (p∨¬p) ∈ Th 2 (Γ) \ Th 0 (Γ), so the inclusions above are proper.
The second part of the claim is obvious. For the last part, note that p ∨ ¬p ∈ Th 2 (∅) and p ∨ ¬p ∈ Th 3 (∅), while p ∨ ¬p ∈ Th 1 (∅). Thus, by what we have already shown in the first part of this proof, it remains to show that |= 4 c3 is not stronger than |= 4 c2 . For this, consider the following set:
The only c 19. I.e., the language of {¬, ∧, ∨, →, t, f }.
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For item (c) it is sufficient to assume that ψ is a disjunction of literals that does not contain an atomic formula and its negation. Assume that Γ |= 
Paraconsistency and relations to classical logic
In what follows we shall write |= 2 for the classical consequence relation, and |= 
otherwise.
20.
Recall that A(Γ) is the set of atomic formulae that appear in some formula of Γ.
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Clearly, N is a model of Γ and N (ψ) ∈ {t, ⊤}. Since Γ |= 
Clearly, M ′ < 4 c M , and since M ′ is the same as N ′ on A(Γ), M ′ is also a model of Γ. Moreover, using the facts that A(Γ ∪ ψ) ∩ A(φ) = ∅ and that M is a model of φ, it follows that M ′ is also a model of φ. Hence M ′ is a model of Γ ∪ {φ}, which is strictly ≤ 
Rational monotonicity may be considered as too strong for assuring rationality, and there are many general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning that do not satisfy this rule. For instance, although |= 4 c1 is rational (by Proposition 33), it does not satisfy rational monotonicity. To see this consider, e.g., Γ = {p, q ⊃ ¬p}, ψ = ¬p ⊃ ¬q, and φ = q. 
Inconsistency adaptation
We conclude this section by showing that |= 4 c2 and |= 4 c3 are, in terms of Batens [BAT 98, BAT 00a, BAT 02], adaptive: if it is possible to distinguish between a consistent part and an inconsistent part of a given theory, then every assertion that classically follows from the consistent part, and is not related to the inconsistent part, is also a |= A plausible inference system should not apply here the Disjunctive Syllogism on Γ ′′ = {p, ¬p∨r} for concluding that r follows from Γ. The reason for this is that ¬p is also true in Γ, and so ¬p ∨ r holds even in cases that r is false. On the other hand, applying the Disjunctive Syllogism on the subset Γ ′ = {q, ¬q ∨ s} (for concluding s from Γ) may be justified by the fact that Γ ′ should not be affected by the inconsistency in Γ, therefore inference rules that are classically valid can be applied on its elements. Now, since Γ can be split-up to two separated subsets, one (Γ ′ ) is consistent, and the other (Γ ′′ ) is inconsistent, it follows from Proposition 36 that Γ |= 
Computability
A general method for reducing questions of consequences in preferential structures to computations of classical entailments is introduced in [ARI 02b, ARI 03b]. This approach is based on a definition of appropriate circumscriptive axioms to capture the notion of minimality and for representing preferential reasoning. In this section we incorporate this method in our framework, and show how reasoning with (graded) uncertainty can be implemented using algorithms for processing circumscriptive theories (such as those of [OHL 96, DOH 97]). As the underlying language of these algorithms is the (propositional or first-order) classical one, our computational method is applied on theories in the classical fragment of Σ, namely: Σ cl = {¬, ∧, ∨, →, f, t}.
Given a theory Γ, the first step according to the approach of [ARI 02b, ARI 03b], is to apply on it the following transformation, that essentially serves as a separator of negated atoms from affirmed ones: 21. An occurrence of p in ψ is called positive if it appears in the scope of an even number of negation operators; otherwise, it is a negative occurrence.
EXAMPLE 39. -Let ψ = ¬(p ∨ ¬q) ∨ ¬q. The first appearance of q in ψ is positive, and the second appearance of q in ψ as well as the appearance of p in ψ are negative.
Consider now the following transformation between four-valued valuations of formulae in Σ cl and two-valued valuations of formulae in Σ
A key result for the computational method is the following:
Lemma 41 immediately entails the following result:
Since, by its definition, |= 4 is the same as |= For a finite set Γ of formulae in Σ cl depending on p ± , and i = 1, 2, denote:
Now we are ready to give a general characterization of reasoning with |= ci -minimal among the models of Γ. Indeed, let ( p ± : ν , q ± : µ) be the two-valued interpretation that interprets the symbols in p ± according to ν and the symbols in q ± according to µ. It is easy to see that ν ≤
. It follows, therefore, that ν satisfies Circ 
Summary and concluding remarks
We have introduced a family of preferential logics that are useful for reasoning with different degrees of incomplete and inconsistent information. It is shown that these logics can be characterized in terms of four-valued consequence relations, and that they can be computed by algorithms that process second-order circumscriptive axioms.
As we have shown, the 'basic' non-degenerated consequence relations (i.e., |= 4 ci where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3) are all different, and none of them is strictly stronger than the other. The decision which one should be used in practice depends, therefore, on further considerations. For instance, the fact that |= 4 c2 and |= 4 c3 are the same as |= 2 as long as the set of premises is classically consistent (but they are not trivial w.r.t. inconsistent set of premises), may be considered as an advantage for applications that need to draw classical conclusions from (classically) consistent theories. For other languages, the relative strength of the consequence relations may be a possible criterion for choosing the most appropriate formalism (see, e.g., Proposition 26 for a comparison of consequence relations with respect to the classical language).
It is worth noting that the logics that are defined here generalize some other formalisms, considered elsewhere in the literature for similar goals. The next proposition shows some examples of this. (respectively, |= 3 LP ) follows from the fact that the {t, f, ⊥}-models (respectively, the {t, f, ⊤}-models) of Γ are the same as the four-valued models of Γ ∪ {p 1 ∧ ¬p 1 ⊃ f, p 2 ∧ ¬p 2 ⊃ f, . . .} (respectively, the four-valued models of Γ ∪ {p 1 ∨ ¬p 1 , p 2 ∨ ¬p 2 , . . .} ).
For the second item, consider an inconsistency set I (in the sense of [ARI 98a, ARI 98b]) in a logical lattice (L, D). It induces an inconsistency order ≤ c in (L, D) , where x ≤ c y iff y ∈ I and x ∈ I. In F OUR, there are two inconsistency sets I 1 = {⊤} and I 2 = {⊤, ⊥}, so the corresponding inconsistency orders in this case are ≤ 4 c1 and ≤ 4 c2 , respectively. Also, it is easy to verify that a four-valued valuation M is an I jmcm of a theory Γ iff it is a c 4 j -mcm of Γ (j = 1, 2), and so for every ψ in Σ and for j = 1, 2, we have that Γ |= will become more feasible. As making decisions in the presence of (different types and levels of) uncertainty is a matter of everyday life, this challenge is certainly worthy.
23. In what follows we shall assume that the reader is familiar with the relevant formalisms, and so we shall omit the corresponding definitions. For more details, one may check the references that appear in the proposition. 24. Note, however, that there is no equivalent in [ARI 98a, ARI 98b] to |=
